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COMMENT

"EVERY ARTIST IS A CANNIBAL, EVERY POET IS
A THIEF":' WHY THE SUPREME COURT WAS
RIGHT TO REVERSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURYFOX
FILM CORP.
JoshuaK Simko*
I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, trademark infringement has arisen out of a likelihood of
confusion in the marketplace.2 Likelihood of confusion occurs when the average
consumer will be confused as to the origin of a product so that she may buy the
wrong thing because the infringing trademark too closely resembles another
product's mark. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act incorporates this test and

* J.D., Duke University School of Law, M.A. Duke University, B.A. Westmont College. The
author is an associate at the law firm of Tonkon Torp LLP in Portland, Oregon. The author would
like to thank David L. Lange for his guidance and friendship. He would also like to thank Heather,
Eden, and Paul.
U2, The Fly,on AcHTUNG BABY (Island Records 1991).

See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc., 264 F.3d 622,60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1080 (6th Cir. 2001); Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1468 (11 th Cir. 2001); Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1107 (5th
Cir. 1999); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), cetl. denied, 514 U.S. 1078 (1995); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 185 (4th Cir. 1984); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 128
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); CBS Inc. v. Liederman, 866 F.
Supp. 763, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affdper curian, 44 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1995);
Blockbuster Entm't Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1581 (E.D. Mich.
1994); Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (D.
Md. 1988).
Each circuit has developed its own unique test, usually consisting of a list of factors to be
2

considered, for finding a likelihood of confusion. See 4J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETIION SS 24:30-24:43 (4th ed. 1996) (providing the factors and the cases from
which the factors are taken). See alro RFsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995)

(identifying the standard of infringement as a "designation that causes a likelihood of confusion").
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imposes liability for false designations of origin, false or misleading descriptions,
or representations of fact that are "likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to
deceive" as to the source of the product. Protection under the Lanham Act is
perpetual. Meanwhile, the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause grants

copyrighted materials protection only for a limited term.3 The question then is
whether the perpetual protection granted under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
can be used on an otherwise copyrightable work to avoid copyright's limited term.

To achieve Lanham Act protection, producers of potentially copyrightable
works may stretch the identifying features of a work such that they (allegedly)
become distinctive and serviceable as trademarks. For example, most readers
familiar with the style ofJ.D. Salinger can tell by the end of the first sentence of
a work if Salinger is the text's author. Under copyright law, however, another
writer could adopt Salinger's style without misappropriating his stories or
characters. That is, an author could adopt Salinger's style without infringing

Salinger's copyright in The Catcherin the Rye or Raise High the Roof Beams, Carpenters.
Could Salinger (or, more likely, his heirs) claim a trademark in his style and
impose liability on anyone mimicking it for creating confusion or deceiving as to
the origin of the story, even after Salinger's copyrights have expired and his books
have entered the public domain? Could Salinger prevent someone else from
editing a condensed or abridged version of his public domain work under his or
her own name? I argue that this should not be the case and that the Supreme
Court got it right in DastarCorp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,4 when it held
as much.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In DastarCorp., Twentieth Century Fox ("Fox") retained Time, Inc. to produce
Crusade in Europe, a World War II television series based on a book by General
Dwight D. Eisenhower.' Time assigned the copyright in the series to Fox, and
Fox failed to renew it.6 Thus, the Crusade in Europe series entered the public
domain.' Dastar Corp. obtained a copy of the series, copied and edited it into a
shorter version, and called it Campaigns in Europe.8 The Dastar version also had
new footage, a new title sequence, and chapter heading sequences.9 Dastar's

§ 8, Cl. 8.
123 S. Ct. 2041, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (2003).

3 U.S. CONST. art. I,
4

s Id at 2044.
6 Id

7Id
aid
9 DatarCorp., 123 S. Ct. at 2044.
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Campaignsvideo did not credit Fox or any of the other parties in the case; Dastar
credited only those Dastar employees who produced the series.1 0
Fox sued Dastar under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, claiming that Dastar's
failure to credit those involved in the New Line videos was a "false designation
of origin."" The Ninth Circuit found Dastar liable for reverse passing off under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because Dastar committed a "bodily appropriation" of Fox's series and "marketed it without attribution to Fox." '2 The Ninth
Circuit rejected Dastar's claim that an independent showing of likelihood of
confusion is required for liability under section 43(a) because the "bodily
appropriation test subsumes the less demanding consumer confusion standard."' 3
The Ninth Circuit's ruling presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity
to resolve the circuit split as to the proper test for finding trademark infringement
and to resolve an important issue it previously had reserved: whether the Lanham
Act can be used as an end-run around the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution to grant authors or creators of works in the public domain perpetual,
copyright-like protection. 4

Id
m0
Id at 2045 n.2. The claim of copyright infringement for General Eisenhower's book was not
at issue before the Supreme Court Also, although the Court heard arguments about the punitive
damages award against Dastar, it did not address them in its decision. Likewise, this Comment
addresses only the issue of whether section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can be used to extend
protection over works within the public domain.
12 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Ent. Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312,314 (9th Cir. 2002),
cer.granted,537 U.S. 1099 (Jan. 10, 2003).

Id (internal quotations and citations omitted).
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(2001). In TrajFix, the Court stated, "TrafFix and some of its [amici] argue that the Patent Clause
of the Constitution, Art. I, §8, cl.
8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent
from claiming trade dress protection ....
We need not resolve this question." Id Of course, the
"Patent Clause" and the Intellectual Property Clause are the same thing. Once protection under that
clause has expired, the work---be it something that was patented or copyrighted--enters the public
domain. The question, then, is whether that public domain work is entitled to Lanham Act
protection at all. That is, can the creator of the public domain work use the Lanham Act to obtain
protection after its constitutionally protected term has expired? Does the Lanham Act permit the
creator to get protection beyond constitutional limits?
1

"
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III. DISCUSSION
A.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION VERSUS BODILY APPROPRIATION AS
APPROACHES TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE LANHAM ACT

1. Likelihood of Confuxion. The purpose of trademark law is to identify goods,5
to prevent fraud and deception in the marketplace, and to protect consumers.'
The traditional approach to trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion, 6
and that test has been incorporated into section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, under
which Fox sued Dastar." At issue in Dastar Corp. is a case of "reverse passing
ofjf'--a situation where an individual sells an item as his own after removing the
actual manufacturer's name or mark. Regardless of the method of the alleged
trademark infringement, however, the test under section 43(a) should be the same.
Dastar's petition for writ of certiorari argued that likelihood of confusion is
nothing more than adherence to the language of the statute, which "prohibits
false designations of origin only if they are 'likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to... the origin' of the goods."'" Therefore, Dastar
argued, the proper analysis for courts to adopt in trademark infringement
cases-including cases of reverse passing off-is the traditional set of nonexclusive factors.'
2. The Ninth Circuit'sBodiy Appropriation Test. In holding Dastar liable for
reverse passing off under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit
followed the bodily appropriation test as set out in Smith v.Montoro.2° In Montoro,
the Ninth Circuit held that reverse passing off violates the Lanham Act because
the "ultimate purchaser (or viewer) is also deprived of knowing the true source
of the product and may even be deceived into believing that it comes from a
different source."'" The Ninth Circuit reasoned in its DastarCorp. opinion that
"Dastar's 'bodily appropriation' of Fox's original series is sufficient to establish

's

Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (2000).

16 See supra note 2 (providing a list of cases deciding the issue of trademark infringement based

on a likelihood of confusion standard).
17 Originally, section 32(1) specifically included likelihood of confusion in its language, and
section 43(a) did not. However, courts read the requirement of likelihood of confusion into section
43(a), and in 1989, Congress incorporated the courts' readings and expressly included the likelihood
of confusion test. See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(I)(A) (2000).
IS

Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox

Film, 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428) (quoting Lanham Act § 43(a)), available at2002WL 32101095

[hereinafter Dastar's Writ of Certiorari].
11Id at 11-12. See aLre 4 McCARTHY, supra note 2 (providing a list of circuits and the factors
adopted).
10 648 F.2d 602, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 775 (9th Cir. 1981).
21

Id at 607.
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reverse passing off, because the 'bodily appropriation' test subsumes the 'less
demanding consumer confusion standard."' 22 In Cleag, v. News Corp., 3 the Ninth
Circuit explained that the bodily appropriation test "recognizes that slight
modifications of a product might cause customer confusion."24 In opposing
Dastar's petition for writ of certiorari, Fox argued that the "multi-factor analysis
may show no likelihood of confusion even where there [has] been a bodily
appropriation of the underlying work"' s and that the bodily appropriation test
conflicts with other circuits" is illusory." Fox further argued that bodily
appropriation is "merely a tool to see if confusion is likely."' Beyond that,
however, Fox's argument that the bodily appropriation test does not replace the
likelihood of confusion analysis relied on the red herrings of misappropriation
and that the DastarCorp. opinion was unpublished and per cmiam,29 without fully
30
elaborating on the lack of real difference between the two tests.

' Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Ent. Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 314 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261-62, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1760, 1765 (9th Cir.
1994)), certgranted,537 U.S. 1099 Oan. 10, 2003).
23 30 F.3d 1255,31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1760 (9th Cir. 1994).
24 Id at 1261.
'sDastar's Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 12.
26

Id at 9-13.

27 Respondent's

Brief in Opposition at 14, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (No.02-428), available at 2002 WL 32101095 [hereinafter Fox Brief in
Opposition].
2 Id at 17.
Id at 16-17. Fox states that Dastar
derives its implausible reading of Ninth Circuit law from the court's failure in its
unpublished per riarm opinion to recite and apply all the factors traditionally
considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis. In light of the evidence and
arguments presented by the parties and the district court's conclusions, that
omission is unsurprising. The finding of likely confusion rested on undisputed
evidence that petitioner made a substantially identical copy of the Series and
identified persons other than respondents as the creators of its product. This
finding received further support from the willfulness of petitioner's appropriation and the evidence of shared consumers.... With such a strong record of
likely confusion, and petitioner's failure to point to any facts contradicting that
conclusion, it would be a mistake to read the Ninth Circuit's brief, unpublished
opinion as creating a new rule that "bodily appropriation," without more, can
establish likely confusion.
Id One interesting question that arises under any approach that includes willfulness in its analysis
is whether that inquiry is even necessary under the likelihood of confusion standard. The intent of
the allegedly infringing party is irrelevant to the likelihood of consumer confusion. Therefore, if
likelihood of confusion is indeed the correct approach, misappropriation should not be a
consideration at all. See infra Part III.A.3 and accompanying text.
" See Fox Brief in Opposition, supranote 27, at 16-17.
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Dastar's reply brief picked up on the weakness of Fox's argument and noted
how Fox relied on the opposite argument-that the Ninth Circuit does notrequire
a showing of likelihood of confusion-when arguing before the Ninth Circuit.,,
Indeed, Fox stated that "this Circuit does not require an independent showing of
confusion to establish reverse passing off.... Confusion is assumed when there
is bodily appropriation." 32 Dastar went on to state that the question is not
whether the Lanham Act requires consumer confusion but whether copying
serves as a proxy for confusion.33
3. The Difference Between the Two and Why L'kehhood of Confwsion is the Prper
Inquiry. Dastar was correct to distinguish the Ninth Circuit's bodily appropriation
test from the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. Although the lines have
blurred as of late, trademark and unfair competition are, historically, a separate
type of protection from copyright. Therefore, authors of previously copyrighted
works in the public domain have, historically, been prevented from using
trademark to obtain perpetual protection. 4 One particularly powerful example
is Meriam v. Holloway Publisbing Co.,3 where the court affirmed the right of any
publisher "to reprint and sell any editions of 'Webster's Dictionary' which were
in the public domain, so long as in doing so they did not falsely suggest that the
reprints were more recent editions which were still under copyright."3' 6 In that
case, Merriam's assertion of trademark in the name or content of "Webster's
Dictionary" was rejected. Justice Miller said,
[I]t occurs to me that this proceeding is an attempt to establish the
doctrine that a party who has had the copyright of a book until it
has expired, may continue that monopoly indefinitely, under the
pretense that it is protected by a trade-mark, or something of that
sort.... When a man takes out a copyright, for any of his writings
or works, he impliedly agrees that, at the expiration of that copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and become

st Dastar Reply Brief at 6, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099
(2003) (No. 02-428), availabkat 2002 WL 32101103 [hereinafter Dastar Reply Brief].
3" See idi (quoting Appellee's Answering Brief at 50, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Ent.
Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-56703) (emphasis in original)).
13 Id at 7.
s' See, eg., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (1938); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Black v. Ehrich, 44 F. 793 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891);
Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883).
35 43 F. 450 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1890).

"BriefofArnici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professor in Support of Petitioner at 5,Dastar
Corp. v.Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (No. 02-428), availabkat2003WL
367727 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Professor Ochoa].
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/5
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public property.... The copyright law gives an author or proprietor a monopoly of the sale of his writings for a definite period, but
the grant of a monopoly implies that, after the monopoly has
expired, the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use of the book.37

In other words, once a work has entered the public domain, it is the property of
no one specifically and everyone generally, and it may be used in any way. Alleged
trademark infringement is a pretense to obtain what copyright specifically refuses
to grant.
The Ninth Circuit's DastarCorp. analysis relied on misappropriation without
adequately distinguishing it from confusion. 3 Instead, the court allowed Dastar's
alleged misappropriation of Crusade in Europe to cloud the issue. A quick look at
misappropriation's history is helpful. Misappropriation got its start in the famous
case of InternationalNews Service v.AssociatedPress." In INS, Justice Pitney framed
the harm as "taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result
of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is
salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and
selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown .... "'
Reaping where one has not sown is the crux of why misappropriation is not
the same as likelihood of confusion. Reaping where one has not sown focuses on
the appropriator's action and moral culpability. A second-coiner's opportunistic
gain from another's effort is, indeed, irksome. But it is not confusing. Confusion
disregards the alleged infringer's intent and focuses on the consumer's ability to
know whose product she is purchasing. The allegedly infringing party could have
every intention of creating a mark similar to that of the party bringing the
action-the "infringing" party could even have the intent to confuse, mislead, and
deceive the consuming public. If the public is not confused or likely to be
confused though, there is no trademark infringement.
Given that confusion and misappropriation are distinct inquiries, why not use
trademark law to protect against misappropriation? That is, why not require
attribution under trademark law? After all, attribution is a useful way of
identifying origins and antecedents in the marketplace, and the public is served by

7

Merriam, 43 F. at 451.

38Amicus Brief of Professor Ochoa, s,pranote 36, at 12 (noting that under the Ninth Circuit's

bodily appropriation test, "a Lanham Act case, which is supposed to focus on consumer confusion,
instead becomes a case about whether copying has occurred, and the amount of copying that has
occurred").
19248 U.S. 215 (1918).
40 Id at 239.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

7

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5

j. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 11:355

knowing the history of certain ideas or original works.4' As readers, we are
accustomed to having certain factual claims substantiated with citations. If
someone makes a claim with which we are unfamiliar with or likely to disagree,
we want to know from where the information came.
'
The article "The Public Domain: Two Relationshipsto a CulturalPublicDomain,"42

by the experimental art and music group (and advocate for a larger public domain)
Negativland provides an example. The artide makes a number of interesting
claims and supports them with apparent facts. Because there are only two
footnotes in the twenty-three page article though, a skeptical reader is left with
unanswered questions. For example, when Negativland says that "Disneyland
claims copyright on any photos taken inside its imagineered landscapes,' 3 one
response is, "Can that be true?" As readers of Negativland's article, we have to
take Negativland at its word. A footnote attributing the source of that information would be useful for at least two reasons. First, a hostile reader may be won
over by good citations or at least be convinced that Negativland is not making
things up-that it is using reliable sources. Second, the reader may want to use
the Negativland article as a repository of research for a further inquiry, but our
hypothetical reader has no clues of where else he might go if he wants to read
more. Thus, too few attributions can be a disservice. In the sense that attribution
is useful to readers, I am an advocate of it. Nonetheless, I would argue that this
attribution, if it involves public domain works, should be a voluntary courtesy on

the part of the work's producer.
The problem with taking the misappropriation doctrine too seriously,
however, is its ability to take something not protectable as property-something
in the public domain--and give it property-like protection through the Lanham
Act. The problem lies not with the principle of granting attribution but with the

inability of divining where one must stop in order to avoid liability.' In Smith v.
Montoro,4s a movie distributor was held liable for making a false designation of
41 There may also be a moral right to attribution. See general4 David L Lange, The Intellctual
Propeny Clause in Contemporar' Trademark Law An Appredation of Two Recnt Esuys andSome Thoughts
About lr/y , e Oughtto Care, 59 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 213,221 (1996). But one should not take
that to mean the law should endeavor to protect that moral right See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Pathof the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897) (stating "nothing but confusion of thought can
result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the
Constitution and the law").
42 Negativland, The Pubic Domain: Two PRtlationshos to a CulturalPubic Domain, 66 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 239, 251 (2003).
3 Id at 251.
' See David Nimmer, 'FdairetofthemAll"andOtherFaiiyTaks ofFairUse, 66 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 263, 265-66 (2003) (discussing the burden of clearing rights of all potential claimants to a
copyrighted work).
45 648 F.2d 602,211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 775 (9th Cir. 1981).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/5
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origin under section 43(a) by deleting a single actor's name from the film credits
and putting another actor's name in its stead." If a single actor is enough to
impose liability, what about the screenwriter, editor, costume designer, or
cameraman who also participated in the creation of the work? It simply becomes
too difficult for an individual or company seeking to use public domain works to
ferret out every individual who has participated in the creation of an original
work. Imposing such a burden does not make sense with works that are in the
public domain and ostensibly free for the taking.
The unique issue of reverse passing off in DastarCorp. raised the issue not of
whether Dastar misled the public by labeling its video series as its own and giving
credit to Dastar employees, but by failing to give Fox attribution as the original
producer.47 Again, the implication for users of public domain works is serious.
Fox argued that the mere fact that the Copyright Act's protections have expired
does not create a license to market public domain works in a
manner likely to deceive consumers .... For example, though
anyone can publish a new edition of Leo Tolstoy's War andPeace, or
make a film or a derivative work based upon it, an aspiring novelist

could not rename that book War in Russia and sell it under his own
name.

48

This assertion potentially limits creative works of art or literature that selfconsciously appropriate earlier works. For example, in the story''Pierre Menard,"
Borges hypothesizes, through a fictional author, that a work that recreates, word
for word (not "copies"), Cervantes' Don Quixote would have meaning separate
from the original work and would indeed be an original work in and of itself,

Id at 606-08.
Some courts have required that a subsequent publisher disclaim any association with the
original publisher of a work. See,e.g., G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 190 F. 927 (6th Cir. 1911),
on rehg, 198 F. 369 (6th Cir. 1912); Ogilve v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 149 F. 858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1907),
affdarmedfied, 159 F. 638 (IstCir. 1908), onappealafterrmand,170 F. 167 (1st Cir. 1909). However,
more recent cases suggest that a subsequent purchaser must only label the public domain work with
its own name. SeeMaljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881,887 (9th Cir.
1996) (stating
When a public domain work is copied, along with its title, there is little likelihood
of confusion when even the most minimal steps are taken to distinguish the
4

41

publisher of the original from that of the copy. The public is receiving just what

it believes it is receiving-the work with which the title has become associated.
The public is not only unharmed, it is unconfused.
(quoting Leslie A. Kurtz, ProleetionforTitkl oflitrar Works in the PblicDomain, 37 RLrG ERS L REV.
53, 77 (1984))).

"sFox Brief in Opposition, supra note 27, at 21.
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despite its exact duplication. Of course, the second version would have meaning
separate from the original Don Quixote since the interpretive assumptions
surrounding the text are now completely altered from those surrounding the
original." The self-conscious reference to the original and presenting the copied
work as a work unmoored from the ties of the original historical context give rise
to new meanings that could never have been contemplated initially, even though
the two works contain exactly the same words. Although Borges' idea has not (to
my knowledge) literally taken place, other art forms such as "found art" that do
bodily appropriate objects and, by placing them in a different context, give them
new meaning. That art, had the Ninth Circuit's test been adopted, would not be
possible.
Dastar's reply to Fox's argument was that since War and Peacehas been in the
United States public domain for over 135 years, "Tolstoy's heirs had no claim
against anyone who used his work for any purpose. Now, thanks to Montoro, they
do."' Had the Supreme Court allowed the Montoro doctrine to stand, users of
public domain works would be faced with liability no matter how they
proceeded-either by omitting the names of the work's originators or by
including the originators' names to an edited work.5 ' Justice Scalia saw this danger
and rightly emphasized the serious practical difficulties that would arise if
attribution was required for public domain works. He noted both the difficulty
in figuring out to whom attribution is owed 2 and the prospect of facing liability
both for crediting the original creator and for failing to credit the original
creator. s3 Therefore, if misappropriation is to continue as a viable trademark
doctrine,'"it should continue as a distinct way of protecting trademark proprietors' investment in their mark and no more. Misappropriation should return to
its place as a separate inquiry from likelihood of confusion. It should, at most,

'9 See ,general4 STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 303-21 (1980) (discussing of the origins of meaning surrounding the
same text).

Dastar Reply Brief, supra note 31, at 3.
"See

I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

6:27, at 6-55 (4th ed. 2002); Amicus Brief of Professor Ochoa, supra note 36, at 12-13 (noting that
both a failure to give attribution and the giving of attribution could be deemed a deception as to

origin).
Dastar Cotp., 123 S. Ct. at 2049 (stating "we do not think the Lanham Act requires this search
for the source of the Nile and all its tributaries").
52

S3lJ

s' It should be noted that the Restatement (I'hird) of Unfair Competition has rejected the
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38, cmt. b
(1995) ("The better approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the
competing interests [of protection and access], does not recognize a residual common law tort of
misappropriation.').

doctrine of misappropriation. See RESTATEMENT
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allow the trademark proprietor to recoup and protect the investment made in
creating and promoting the mark."5
Beyond (or before) that recoupment, however, lies the separate inquiry of
consumer confusion. In DastarCorp., the question is whether Dastar's alleged
misappropriation and admitted copying of Fox's video series has prevented Fox
from recouping its investment in the product.5 6 My argument is that any work in
the public domain should, by definition, be deemed to have recouped its
investment through its limited monopoly granted by the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution." In the case of DastarCorp. then, Fox should have no claim for
recoupment of its expenses since its video series was in the public domain at the
time of Dastar's appropriation of it. Since Dastar had full access to Fox's public
domain video series, in what sense would Dastar's Campaignsvideos be anything
other than Dastar's product?
By focusing on the definition of "origin" under section 43(a), the Court
reached essentially the same conclusion. Justice Scalia declared that for purposes
of section 43(a), "the most natural understanding of the origin of goods, the
source of wares, is the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace.""s This understanding renders the "origin of goods.. . incapable of
connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that
'goods' embody or contain."5 9 This understanding re-centers the section 43(a)
analysis on likelihood of consumer confusion.

5s Lange, supra note 41, at 220-21. Seegeneralb Frank I. Schecter, The RaionalBais of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).
s One problem with such a theory is that it is difficult to define any boundaries to it. That is,
as long as Fox continued to market and promote the videocassettes under its own name, it is
arguably an investment in the mark and, therefore, protectable. Without the rule that public domain
works have, by definition, recouped their investment, the theory is in danger of being no more
contained than it is in its current state.
s U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, d. 8.

51DastarCorp., 123 S. Ct. at 2047. Scalia uses the 1949 Webster's New International Dictionary
as the beginning of his inquiry to the meaning of section 43(a)'s language. While it makes little
difference in the Dastarcase, such reliance may be misplaced. Although the Lanham Act was
adopted in 1949, the dictionary reflects only understandings and definitions of works up to 1949 and
may not accurately reflect any current connotations or new associations occurring in 1949, after the
1949 dictionary was published.
Moreover, by attempting to fix the meaning as it existed in 1949 and adopting it wholesale
to the present may ignore that current cultural, political, and historical circumstances and thus may
validly warrant a new understanding of those same words. Scalia would likely respond that if that
is the case, the legislature must make that clear, or he may say language does not change that quickly;
it takes years for meanings and connotations to change, even slightly. He may be right. Nonetheless,
I will leave that debate, since it is beyond the scope of this Comment, and because I largely agree
with the interpretation Scalia adopted.
9 Id
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This re-centering is a good thing for several reasons. First, it is consistent with
the original purpose behind trademark protection, as previously discussed.
Second, it produces certainty for producers of products. Anyone using public
domain material is free to do so without fear of litigation. This, in turn, assures
the public increased competition among publishers and producers of various
editions of public domain works. For example, when one buys a Dover Thrift
Edition of The Scarlet Letter or Dubliners, one knows that is what one is
getting-there is no confusion as to the source. What is more, one likely does not
care. What you get in a Dover Thrift Edition is a cheap version of a book in the
public domain; if you want critical material, you go to a different publisher such
as St. Martin's Press. Neither of these publishers is obligated to credit Hawthorne's orJoyce's original publishers; they must only identify themselves clearly
as the producer of that particular edition of the work so as to avoid confusion in
the marketplace-to avoid confusion over a public domain work that has been
copied, word for word, bodily appropriated, if you will, from the original. This
is exactly what Dastar did-it identified its video series as its own product; there
was no way the public could have thought it was Fox's edition.
Third, re-centering the section 43(a) analysis on likelihood of confusion paves
the way for artists and producers of creative works to incorporate prior public
domain works, thereby enhancing meaning and allowing a richness and
complexity of interpretation, which in turn allows how we define and reflect our
own culture and understandings of it to flow legitimately from and acknowledge
what has gone before.' Artists draw upon the work of their predecessors freely,
and even bodily appropriate their predecessors' work, so as to further innovate.
One cannot listen to Bob Dylan without hearing echoes of Woody Guthrie, read
T.S. Eliot (orJames Joyce or Nabokov) without realizing that much of the text's
meaning is derived from allusion to characters and themes drawn from other
works, or look at a French Impressionist painting without thinking of Monet.6
The Academy Award TM winning Shakespeare in Love incorporated myriad
references to Shakespeare's work and adopted many of his lines word for word.
Indeed, part of what makes those works worthwhile is their conscious nod to and
incorporation of prior practitioners' work. Under Montoro, that use could have
been disallowed as a false designation of origin. Had the Court adopted Montoro,
Disney could prevent a competitor from making an animated film based on the
Exodus story. The examples are far too numerous to continue listing, but it
suffices to say that Justice Scalia and the rest of the Court wisely protected this

6 See Negativiand, simpra note 42, at 251-57.
6 The list one could write of works that incorporate prior works is virtually endless, as all
creative work necessarily depends on prior work. Even when the subsequent work does so
purposefully, the end product is no less original.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss2/5
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interest by restricting the meaning of "origin" for purposes of section 43(a) to the
actual producer of the tangible product in the marketplace. If meaning itself
depends on cultural situations and what has gone before, why would we not wish
to deepen the context against which we can legitimately define ourselves? That
is, why turn something valuable-something that has been done throughout
history-and make it illicit? To prevent misappropriation-reaping where one
has not sown? Maybe. But if that is what we are seeking to prevent, then
copyright (not trademark) is the proper avenue for protection.
Fourth, re-centering the trademark inquiry to the likelihood of confusion
avoids conflict with copyright or patent law and allows the separate legislations
to carry their own weight.
Fifth, re-centering the section 43(a) analysis on likelihood of confusion avoids
putting the Lanham Act in direct conflict with the Constitution. The Ninth
Circuit's protection of creative works from misappropriation under the Lanham
Act did the opposite. Authors of original works that had fallen into the public
domain could have extended their protection perpetually, despite the Constitution's6" and the Copyright Act's mandate for only a limited term.3 Using the
Lanham Act in this way puts users of public domain works in danger of liability,
regardless of whether they mention the original creator."

62 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 8.
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909); see a.o 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2000). Moreover, section 8 of the

1909 Copyright Act specifically states that "No copyright shall subsist in... any work which is in
the public domain." 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1909). Although apparently obvious, it seems appropriate to
point out that the protections of the Copyright Act apply only to copyrighted works; public domain
works receive no copyright protection.
' Professor Tyler T. Ochoa's amicus brief makes this point especially well. He states that using
section 43(a) to prevent parties from publishing public domain works under their own name places
them in a
'heads I win, tails you lose' situation. If Dastar had chosen to publish a revised
version of the public domain work under its original title, giving credit to Fox,
SFM and New Line, those entities could have sued, claiming deception as to
origin, sponsorship or approval of the revised version under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. Instead, Dastar truthfully published the revised version under its
own name, as producer of the actual videotapes in question; and Fox, SFM and
New Line have sued Dastar forfdnkg to credit them as former distributors of the
underlying public domain work. If such a cause of action is upheld, those who
seek to publish public domain material will be placed in an untenable position.
They risk liability if they use the name of the former owner of an expired
copyright without permission, and they risk liability if they fail to use the name
of the former owner of the expired copyright at all. Such an interpretation of the
Lanham Act would essentially guarantee that publishers of public domain
material would face a lawsuit and would deter such publishers from copying
works in the public domain.
Amicus Brief of Professor Ochoa, smpra note 36, at 12-13 (citation omitted); see alo Dastar Reply
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The Copyright Act, under the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution,
has done the balancing between the individual and public good with regard to
creative works and concluded that the goals are best achieved through monopolies granted for limited times only. Thus, Fox was allowed to exploit its
monopoly while its video series was protected under copyright and no longer. To
allow Fox or any other originator of a public domain work to use the Lanham Act
to make an end-run around that constitutional determination and allow perpetual
protection for works in the public domain is beyond the power of the Lanham
Act and the Intellectual Property Clause.
Finally, allowing the Lanham Act to grant quasi-copyright protection
perpetually has First Amendment implications.6 The proprietors of a public
domain work could prevent any use of that work in ways the proprietor found not
to his liking. If we take seriously the premise that artists use what has gone
before, and in fact depend on it for their own original creations, then allowing the
Lanham Act to exclude some works perpetually from the public domain is akin
to removing certain words from the language.
B. CONCLUSION: THE LANHAM ACT CANNOT BE USED TO EXTEND PERPETUALLY COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO WORKS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

My quarrel is not with the protection of original works of authorship; rather,
it is the extension of that protection beyond what is constitutionally permissible
under the Intellectual Property Clause. Trademark law cannot and should not be
an end-run around copyright protection. Trademark protects consumers; to allow
originators of public domain works to use trademark law as a way of continuing
their monopoly over a work robs the public domain (and thereby robs artists of
valuable source material) and inhibits competition. Congress and the Constitution
have already balanced the competing interests of creators and the public in
original works via the Copyright Act. Trademark law under the Lanham Act
should return to its roots of protecting consumers and makers of competing
goods from confusion in the marketplace and not be bootstrapped into doing
copyright's work. Copyright has its own strength, and is not the world in need
of support from an ersatz Atlas disguising himself as the Lanham Act?

Brief, rufranote 31, at 11 (arguing that both inclusion and omission could lead to liability under
Fox's reading of the Lanham Act).
s See William Van Alstyne, Recondng What the FirstAmendment Forbids With What the Copyright
Clause Pmeits: A Summary Explanation and Renvew, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003)
(discussing First Amendment limits to Copyright Clause Power).
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